Causality in medicine, and its relation to action, mechanisms, and probability by Auker-Howlett, Daniel & Wilde, Michael Edward
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Auker-Howlett, Daniel and Wilde, Michael Edward  (2019) Causality in medicine, and its relation
to action, mechanisms, and probability.  Review of: Causality, Probability, and Medicine  by
UNSPECIFIED.   Metascience .    ISSN 0815-0796.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11016-019-00430-0




Causality in medicine, and its relation to action, mechanisms, and probability. 
 
Donald Gillies. Causality, Probability, and Medicine. Abingdon, Routledge. 2018. £29.99. 
 
Daniel Auker-Howlett  
dja35@kent.ac.uk 




University of Kent, Canterbury, United Kingdom.  
 
Medical researchers want to find out the causes of disease, and they want to find out what 
works to prevent or cure those diseases. A good deal of recent work in the philosophy of 
medicine has therefore been concerned with the issue of working out exactly what sort of 
evidence is required to establish a causal hypothesis in medicine (Russo and Williamson 2007, 
Howick 2011, Parkkinen, et al. 2018, Clarke, et al. 2014). One way to make progress on this 
epistemological issue is to first work out the correct metaphysical theory of causality for 
medicine. In this book, Donald Gillies supports a particular theory of generic causality for 
theoretical medicine by testing it against detailed historical case studies in medicine. He then 
investigates the implications of such a theory for the epistemology of medicine.   
 
The book comes in three parts. In the first part, Gillies proposes a version of a so-called action-
related theory of deterministic causality, where an action-related theory stresses the connection 
between causal laws and interventions. He argues that this theory compares favourably to 
alternative action-related theories of causality advocated by Gasking (1955), Menzies and Price 
(1993), and Woodward (2003). Gillies responds to the main objections to an action-related 
theory of causality, including the infamous worry that some causes cannot be manipulated. His 
idea is that causal laws involving non-manipulable causes can still be the basis of avoidance 
actions. Indeed, medicine is typically more interested in such avoidance actions, because it is 
interested in avoiding disease. He develops these ideas by appealing to a detailed and insightful 
discussion of Koch’s efforts to establish the comma bacillus as the cause of cholera.  
 
 
Figure 1: Table showing the two by two classification of types of evidence in medicine. 
 
The second part of the book is more epistemological in that it discusses the different types of 
evidence needed to confirm causal laws in medicine. Gillies applies the well-known distinction 
between interventional and observational evidence to the more recent distinction between 
statistical evidence and evidence of mechanism to produce a two by two classification of types 
of evidence (Figure 1). He argues that strong confirmation of a causal hypothesis in medicine 
requires the combination of these different types of evidence. In particular, Gillies advocates 
the evidential principle of strength through combining, which is a principle based upon the 
work of Phyllis Illari (2011): 
 
“Each type of evidence will naturally have strengths and weaknesses. Suppose, 
however, that the weaknesses of evidence of type 𝛼 are compensated for by the 
strengths of evidence of type 𝛽, and vice versa. Then the combination of evidence of 
type 𝛼 with evidence of type 𝛽 will give an overall confirmation to the hypothesis 𝐻 
much greater than would be obtained by a comparable amount of evidence just of type 
𝛼 or a comparable amount of evidence just of type 𝛽.” (130) 
 
His argument here appeals to a detailed case study of the research into the causes of coronary 
heart disease. Among other things, Gillies argues that the interventional evidence of 
mechanisms from cholesterol-fed rabbits was complemented by the observational evidence 
concerning the mechanisms of atherosclerosis in humans.  
 
Gillies then considers a thesis stronger than but related to the principle of strength through 
combining, namely, the Russo-Williamson thesis: ‘A causal hypothesis in medicine can be 
established only by using both statistical evidence and evidence of mechanism’ (133). The idea 
here is that the strengths of statistical evidence overcome the weaknesses of evidence of 
mechanisms, and vice versa (Russo and Williamson 2007, Illari 2011). Gillies argues that the 
streptomycin trial and the thalidomide disaster provide good reasons to accept the Russo-
Williamson thesis. However, Gillies prefers a weak version of the thesis, which requires 
statistical evidence and evidence only of a plausible rather than confirmed mechanism (cf. Illari 
(2011) and Wilde and Parkkinen (2017)). His argument here appeals to a case study on the 
health effects of tobacco smoking: in order to establish that smoking was a cause of heart 
disease it was necessary to have at least evidence of a plausible mechanism; in order to establish 
that smoking was a cause of lung cancer it was sufficient to have statistical evidence and 
evidence only of a plausible mechanism. Gillies then provides a sustained defence of his weak 
version of the Russo-Williamson thesis in light of a bunch of putative counterexamples. His 
defence introduces a number of modifications to the thesis. In particular, Gillies argues for a 
more inclusive understanding of statistical evidence, as well as the caveat that it can be justified 
to adopt a medical intervention provisionally in the absence of evidence of a mechanism. He 
thinks that this is the correct way to respond to the case of Ignaz Semmelweis (Broadbent 2011, 
Howick 2011).  
 
Importantly, Gillies argues that his action-related theory of causality motivates the principle of 
interventional evidence: ‘A causal law cannot be taken as established unless it has been 
confirmed by some interventional evidence’ (24). One way to advance the debate here may be 
to consider possible counterexamples to this principle of interventional evidence. In particular, 
it might be argued that observational statistical evidence is in some cases enough to establish 
a causal hypothesis in medicine, so long as the observed correlation exhibits certain 
characteristics, for example, a consistent dose-response curve. Of course, the problem with this 
argument is that there may still exist alternative non-causal explanations of the observed 
correlation. One strategy for dealing with this problem is to attempt to disconfirm these 
alternative non-causal explanations. Gillies calls this strategy one. He provides a nice example 
of the strategy in his case study of the correlation observed between saturated fat and heart 
disease (115-118). However, Gillies thinks that strategy one is insufficient to properly establish 
a causal hypothesis because it does not require interventional evidence. He prefers a strategy 
of gathering evidence of a mechanism that can explain the extent of the observed correlation. 
He thinks that this mechanistic strategy satisfies the principle of interventional evidence 
because mechanisms are to be defined in terms of his action-related theory of causality. This 
is an ingenious move, but it might complicate the two by two classification of types of evidence 
given in Figure 1. According to this classification, it is possible to get observational evidence 
of a mechanism. Given this, it looks like observational evidence can itself meet the principle 
of interventional evidence. It is therefore no longer clear that strategy one fails to satisfy the 
principle of interventional evidence, so long as disconfirming non-causal explanations of an 
observed correlation is a way of confirming that a mechanism explains the correlation. One 
way to deal with these complications may be to more explicitly distinguish between the objects 
of evidence and the methods by which that evidence is gathered (Illari 2011). 
 
In the third part of the book, Gillies extends his action-related theory of deterministic causality 
in order to also provide a theory of indeterministic causality. His idea is to appeal to the 
mathematical theory of probability. Of course, there have been many failed attempts to define 
causality in terms of probability by appealing to the guiding intuition that a cause raises the 
probability of its effects. A nice overview of the major attempts has been provided by Jon 
Williamson (2009). One problem here is the Hesslow counterexample (Hesslow 1976): 
Although it is known to be a cause of thrombosis, taking the contraceptive pill may in fact 
lower the probability of thrombosis, since it lowers the probability of pregnancy, which is 
another cause of thrombosis. Gillies wants a way to relate causality and probability that saves 
the guiding intuition from this Hesslow counterexample. His approach is to argue that the truth 
of a causal claim is relative to a reference class by appealing to a propensity theory of 
probability, according to which the probability of an event is its propensity from within a 
reference class: Although taking the contraceptive pill does not raise the probability of 
thrombosis relative to the reference class of all women, it may still be a cause of thrombosis 
relative to the classes of both pregnant and non-pregnant women, since it may still raise the 
probability of thrombosis in each of these reference classes. An alternative approach is to relate 
causality and probability in a more sophisticated manner by appealing to causal models such 
as Bayesian networks, which are made mathematically tractable with the help of the causal 
Markov condition (Pearl 2000). However, Gillies argues that such Bayesian networks are not 
empirically well-corroborated, because some causal structures in medicine are best modelled 
by multi-causal forks, and these multi-causal forks do not satisfy the causal Markov condition. 
His example involves a detailed case study of the research into the multiple causes of coronary 
heart disease. Of course, there is then a worry about the mathematical tractability of these non-
Markovian models. Gillies argues that non-Markovian models can be made mathematically 
tractable by appealing to some theorems by Aidan Sudbury. He thinks that these models are 
both empirically well-corroborated in medicine and mathematically tractable.  
 
Although the book often deals with quite technical and complicated material, it remains 
accessible throughout because the written expression is characteristically clear and engaging. 
All of the mathematical details are confined to a couple of appendices, which sit alongside a 
helpful glossary of medical terms. The book is also an excellent example of an approach in the 
philosophy of science that draws philosophical conclusions on the basis of a close examination 
of historical examples from actual scientific practice. Gillies says that ‘one must study history 
and philosophy of science, and not philosophy of science without the history. Only the history 
of science can provide the variety of examples needed for philosophy of science’ (21). This 
historical approach allows him to make a number of important contributions, which further 
present debates about evidential pluralism in medicine, the nature of causality and its 
relationship to both actions and causal mechanisms, the propensity interpretation of probability 
and its relationship to indeterministic causality, and the application of causal networks in 
medicine. It is therefore essential reading for anyone working in the history and philosophy of 
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